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4Glossary
AUTP  : Asuransi Usaha Tani Padi (Agricultural Insurance Program for Rice 
Farmers)
JKN : Jaminan Kesehatan Nasional (National Health Insurance); Financial 
assistance through health insurance for low-income households
KIS : Kartu Indonesia Sehat (Card for Healthy Indonesians); Further 
development of National Health Insurance with additional benefits 
for low-income households 
KIP : Kartu Indonesia Pintar (Card for Smart Indonesians); Financial 
assistance on education services for low-income households
PKH : Program Keluarga Harapan (Hopeful Family Program). Conditional 
cash transfer program for low-income households
Raskin : Beras untuk Orang Miskin (Rice for the Poor); Subsidized rice program 
for low-income households
Rastra : Beras Sejahtera (Prosperous Rice); The new name for Raskin with the 
same function.
5Executive Summary
The agricultural sector covers 34% of the total employment in Indonesia in 2014, larger than 
those employed in services, and second only to industry sector. In estimation, this amounts to 
more than fifty million people - a significant share of the Indonesian workforce. Unfortunately, 
most of them live below the poverty line or just slightly above it. In rice-producing districts such 
as Indramayu in West Java, landless farm workers earn only about IDR 300,000 per month 
and small-scale farmers make less than IDR 600,000 per month from farm work. Limited job 
opportunities in the villages, poor irrigation systems, and unpredictable weather are among the 
factors that add to rural predicaments. Consequently, people in the villages choose to migrate 
into cities, indicated by the decreasing percentage of rural population compared to the total 
population in the country, from 50% in 2010 to just 46% in 2015.
To address this situation, the government allocates funds that enable farmers to buy seeds, 
fertilizers, and rice at subsidized prices. However, government agencies acknowledge that this 
support is ineffective. Despite their hefty annual state budget of IDR 52 trillion, the subsidized 
products are of low quality and their poor distribution systems leading to black market activities. 
Only the rich, well-connected farmers take advantage of these subsidies.
As poor farmers and farm workers struggle with their low-income, more targeted support 
programs such as conditional cash transfers (Program Keluarga Harapan/PKH) and financial 
assistance for healthcare (Kartu Indonesia Sehat/KIS) and education (Kartu Indonesia Pintar/KIP) 
are recommended. These programs can be more effective as they directly address recipients 
with insufficient earnings to cover their healthcare and education expenses. Meanwhile, 
agricultural insurance programs for rice farmers (Asuransi Usaha Tani Padi/AUTP) can help them 
by alleviating their income losses due to harvest failures. However, these programs are currently 
unable to reach their objectives due to budget restraints as their funds are less than half of the 
farm subsidies.
There are three possible solutions: firstly, the government may reallocate funds, from ineffective 
and costly farm subsidies to the more targeted and effective PKH, KIS, KIP, and AUTP schemes. 
These programs have greater impact on people’s livelihood and reducing farmers’ risk of income 
losses. This approach will require a paradigm shift, in which the government must improve 
public awareness that the subsidies only benefit the wealthy farmers. Secondly, once the budget 
of PKH, KIS, KIP, and AUTP increases, their coverage can be expanded along with an improvement 
of their targeting efforts and the infrastructure of the support systems. Thirdly, the government 
may develop their insurance policy as a tool to protect the farmers of various food crops against 
the risk of harvest failures. The insurance benefits must be clearly communicated to the farmers, 
the processes involved must be simplified, and the coverage to remote areas must be expanded 
in partnership with private insurance firms that maintain a wide network of branches and agents.
6Study Approaches
This paper is the result of desktop research conducted from October 2016 to February 2017, 
using secondary data from various textbooks, academic papers, and official reports as the main 
sources. In addition, a field research was conducted in April 2017 in Karang Layung Village, Sukra 
Sub-district, Indramayu District, West Java Province. This location was selected as Indramayu is 
the top rice producer in West Java, in which its production of wetland paddy reached more than 
1.2 million tons in 2014, or around 11.5% of the total production in the province.1 The research 
was conducted by using semi-structured interviews and focus group discussions with ten 
farmers and two farm workers from different villages. 
1 Statistics Indonesia (2016), Provinsi Jawa Barat Dalam Angka 2016 [Jawa Barat Province in Figures 2016], p. 264
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7Current Situation
Agriculture is one of the major sectors in Indonesia employing 54.8 million of the labor force.2 
Unfortunately, most of the people who work in this sector live below the poverty line or just 
slightly above it. The World Bank recorded that 34.3 million of agricultural workforce are poor or 
in danger of becoming poor as they earn less than US$ 1.90 per day.3 4
Table 1
Incomes in sample villages in West and Central Java5
No. Village & District Landholding Status
Proportion of the 
Agricultural Workforce (%)
Average Monthly Income 
Per Person* (IDR)
Distance to 
Poverty Line (%)**
1. Wanakerta, 
Indramayu, 
West Java
Landless farm 
workers
60 333,000 -35.8
Small-scale farmers
(<0.25 ha)
15 583,000 12.3
2. Sidosari, 
Kebumen, 
Central 
Java
Landless farm 
workers
10 277,000 -46.6
Small-scale farmers
(<0.25 ha)
46 555,000 6.9
3. Sarimulyo, 
Cilacap, 
Central 
Java
Landless farm 
workers
5 333,000 -35.8
Small-scale farmer
(<0.25 ha)
42 500,000 -3.6
* = Excluding additional income from off-farm activities
** = Based on the International Poverty Line by the World Bank6 
(-) = Below poverty line; (+) = Above poverty line
Source: Collated from Ambarwati et al. (2015)7 and The World Bank (2015)
Table 1 shows that in selected villages in rice-producing districts in West Java and Central Java,8 
the majority of the agricultural workforce does not earn sufficient incomes from farm work to 
live above the poverty line. Small-scale farmers in Indramayu and Kebumen, who own less than 
0.25 ha of land, are highly vulnerable to fall into poverty as they earn, respectively, just 12.3 or 
6.9% more than those at the poverty line.9
This predicament correlates with various challenges they encounter. The first challenge 
relates to limited job opportunities in the rural areas. The number of landholding households 
2 Author’s calculation based on the data from The World Bank (2017): Population, total (http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/
SP.POP.TOTL?locations=ID); Employment to population ratio, 15+, total (%) (modeled ILO estimate) (http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SL.EMP.TOTL.SP.ZS?locations=ID); World Development Indicators: Agricultural employment to total employment ratio 
(http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.2) 
3 The World Bank (2014), ‘Informal Agriculture Workers in Indonesia Try to Avoid Poverty’. Accessible on http://www.worldbank.
org/en/news/video/2014/05/08/informal-agriculture-workers-in-indonesia-try-to-avoid-poverty. [Accessed 17 November 2016].
4 The World Bank (2015). Indonesia’s Rising Divide – Executive Summary, p.20. The poor earns less than USD 1.30 per day = IDR 518,900 
per month. USD 1 = IDR 13,307 (average exchange rate in 2016; www.x-rates.com). In order to be considered safe from poverty in the 
following year, a person must earn at least 50% above the poverty line or at least USD 1.90 per day = IDR 758,500 per month.
5 Alternatively, the Farmers Index (NTP) is being used to estimate the farmers’ welfare. The NTP compares their farm revenues with their 
production cost and household expenditures. However, the Ministry of Agriculture considers this method problematic due to the price 
fluctuations of the farm products. Kompas (2016), ‘Sudah Tepatkah Polemik Analisis Kesejahteraan Petani? [Polemic on Farmers’ Welfare 
Analysis: Is it the Right Way?]. http://biz.kompas.com/read/2016/04/25/154401628/Sudah.Tepatkah.Polemik.Analisis.Kesejahteraan.Petani
6 See footnote 4
7 Ambarwati, Aprilia and Harahap, Ricky Ardian (2015), ‘Tanah untuk Penggarap? Penguasaan Tanah dan Struktur Agraris di 
Beberapa Daerah Penghasil Padi [Land for the Tillers? Land Tenure and Agrarian Structure in Some Rice Producing Villages]’, 
Jurnal Analisis Sosial [Journal for Social Analysis], 19 (1), p. 20, 21, 22
8 West Java and Central Java are two of Indonesia’s main rice producers. In 2015, these two provinces produced more than 22 million 
tonnes of rice or 30% of the total national production (Statistics Indonesia, Statistik Indonesia - Statistical Yearbook 2016, p. 205)
9 See footnote 4.
8is decreasing and more farmers have become landless farm workers.10 Land ownership and 
access are concentrated in the hands of a small number of villagers, while opportunities to work 
as hired farm workers are limited. For example, in several villages in Indramayu, West Java 
Province– where the agricultural sector is dominated by landless farm workers – landowners 
prefer to employ just one or two trusted workers to perform all pre-harvest work.
Table 2
Change in number of landholding agricultural households by land area controlled, 2003 & 2013
No Farm size (ha)
Number of households (million) Change
2003 2013 Number (million) %
1 <0.1 9.38 4.34 -5.04 -53.75
2 0.10 – 0.19 3.60 3.55 -0.05 -1.45
3 0.20 – 0.49 6.82 6.73 -0.08 -1.23
4 0.5 – 0.99 4.78 4.55 -0.23 -4.76
5 1.0 – 1.9 3.66 3.73 0.70 1.76
6 2.0 – 2.9 1.68 1.62 -0.55 -3.27
7 ≥3.0 1.31 1.61 0.30 22.81
Total 31.23 26.14 -5.10 -16.32
Source: Statistics Indonesia (2013)11
Table 2 shows that from 2003 to 2013, the number of landholding agricultural households 
decreased by more than 16%. While the number of landholding households with farm sizes of 
1.0 – 1.9 ha and ≥ 3 ha increased by 700,000 and 300,000 respectively, more than 5 million 
households with farm sizes of ≤ 0.1 ha lost their landholding status and potentially become 
landless farm workers. The increasing number of landless farm workers12 coupled with the 
shortage of work opportunities in villages makes it harder for them to earn a sufficient income 
to sustain their livelihood.
The second challenge is related to the irrigation system used by the farmers, especially rice 
farmers. Table 3 below shows that currently 57% of rice farms in Indonesia use irrigation to 
water the crops. Unfortunately, from 7.2 million ha of irrigation infrastructure in the country, 
3.7 million or nearly 52% of them are in poor condition13 due to soil sedimentation, rampant 
weeds, the absence of irrigation monitoring systems in the villages, and uncertainty on who must 
provide the funding for repair.14 As a result, crops are exposed to the risk of drought which will 
lead to harvest failures and income losses for the farmers.
10 Ben White, Aprilia Ambarwati, Ricky Ardian Harahap, and Isono Sadoko, Agriculture (2016), Land Tenure and Livelihoods. ed. 
by John F. McCarthy and Kathryn Robinson, Land & Development in Indonesia: Searching for the People’s Sovereignty (Singapore: 
ISEAS Publishing (Indonesia Update Series), p.278 - 279
11 Statistics Indonesia (2013), Laporan Hasil Sensus Pertanian 2013 (Agricultural Census 2013), p. 12
12 See footnote 10, p.278
13 Ministry of Agriculture (2015), ‘Rencana Strategis Kementerian Pertanian Tahun 2015 - 2019 [Ministry of Agriculture Strategic 
Planning 2015 - 2019]’.
14 Trisna Subarna, Agus Muharam, and Nana Sutrisna (2006), ‘Upaya Peningkatan Kelembagaan Sistem Pengairan di Kabupaten 
Karawang, Jawa Barat [Institutional Development on the Irrigation System in Karawang District, West Java]’, in Pengelolaan 
Lahan dan Air di Indonesia [The Management of Land and Water in Indonesia], ed. by Effendi Pasandaran, Bambang Sayaka and Tri 
Pranadji (Jakarta: Ministry of Agriculture - Department of Agricultural Research and Development), p.196
9Table 3
Type of Rice Fields in Indonesia
No. Type of Rice Field Total Size (ha) Characteristics
1. Irrigated 4,417,582 - Mainly uses man-made water channels
- Water supplied by rivers or dams
2. Rain fed 2,848,753 - Mainly uses rain water
- During the dry season, farmers switch to other crops, 
such as corn and cassava
3. River tide 300,710 - Located near rivers
- As high river tides cause floods, farmers can only plant 
their crops during the low tide
4. River bank 174,182 - Located at the river banks
- Uses water overflown from the rivers to water the crops
TOTAL 7,741,224
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (2016)15
The third challenge is the impact of unpredictable weather and the associated risk of floods and 
droughts.16 In January 2014, floods in Java, Sulawesi, Sumatera, Nusa Tenggara, and Kalimantan17 
destroyed 400,000 ha of rice fields with a total loss estimated at IDR 1.2 trillion.18 Meanwhile, a 
prolonged drought in 2015 and early 2016 forced the farmers to delay their rice planting by three 
months,19 resulting in serious income reduction for agricultural households in various parts of 
Indonesia as shown in Figure 1 below.
Figure 1
Impact of 2015 to early 2016 drought on agricultural workers’ income in East Java, East and 
West Nusa Tenggara, and Papua
Farm 
workers
Non-Food crops 
farmers
Severe (>30% reduced) Moderate (10-30% reduced)
Slight (10% or less) No impact
100%
46%
49%
33%
27%
21%
29%
10%
15%
6%
18%
15%
32%
90%80%70%60%50%40%30%20%10%0%
Food crops 
farmers
Source: World Food Programme (2016)20
15 Ministry of Agriculture (2016), Pengelolaan Data Lahan Sawah, Alat dan Mesin Pertanian, dan Jaringan Irigasi [Data Management 
on Rice Field, Agriculture Equipment and Machinery, and Irrigation Infrastructure], ed. by Directorate General of Agricultural 
Infrastructure (Solo) p. 9 - 10
16 Kabul Indrawan (2015), ‘Dampak Subsidi, Bantuan Benih, Anomali Cuaca Dan Perekonomian Dalam Negeri Terhadap Konsumsi 
Benih Tanaman Pangan Serta Pertanian di Indonesia [Impact of Seeds Subsidies, Weather Anomaly, and Domestic Economy on the 
Consumption of Food Crops Seeds and Indonesian Agriculture]’, (Media Research Center), p. 2 & 4
17 Andi Abdussalam (2014), ‘Indonesian Govt Still Taking Stock of Flood-Affected Rice Fields’, AntaraNews. Accessible on http://www.
antaranews.com/en/news/92384/indonesian-govt-still-taking-stock-of-flood-affected-rice-fields [Accessed 01 December 2016].
18 National Geographic (2014), ‘Bencana Banjir Rusak 400.000 Ha Lahan Pertanian’. Accessible on http://nationalgeographic.co.id/
berita/2014/02/bencana-banjir-rusak-400000-ha-lahan-pertanian.
19 US Department of Agriculture - Foreign Agricultural Service (2016), ‘Indonesia: Rice Production Prospects Reduced by El Nino’, 
in Commodity Intelligence Report. Accessible on http://www.pecad.fas.usda.gov/highlights/2016/03/Indonesia/Index.htm. 
20 World Food Programme (2016), ‘The Impact of Drought on Households in Four Provinces in Eastern Indonesia’, (Jakarta), p. 13
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Hardship in the rural areas makes the younger generation prefer working as 
factory workers rather than working on farms21 and to seek job opportunities in 
nearby cities. This contributed to the increasing proportion of urban population in 
the country, from 50% in 2010 to 54% in 2015.22 With the migration of the youth 
to the cities, Statistics Indonesia recorded that currently almost 16 million or 
more than 60% of heads of agricultural households are aged between 45 and 
above 65 years old.23 Ageing farmers often show certain characteristics that 
include declining physical abilities, reluctance to innovation, and lack of vision for 
strategic planning.24
Existing Policies to Protect and Assist the Farmers
A. Subsidy programs
In its attempt to protect farmers’ livelihood, the Indonesian government imposes policies that are 
primarily part of a food self-sufficiency25 objective as stipulated in Law 18/2012 on Food Security 
and Law 19/2013 on the Protection and Empowerment of Farmers. Article 15 of both laws stipulate 
that the government prioritizes local agriculture products to meet domestic needs, while Article 30 
of Law 19/2013 states that it is prohibited to import agriculture commodities when the domestic 
supply is deemed sufficient by the government. Furthermore, Article 21 of the same law stipulates 
that the government is authorized to provide farmers with subsidies, including seeds and fertilizers, 
to reduce the farmers’ costs and eventually to achieve the objective of food self-sufficiency. An 
overview and the legal bases of farm subsidy programs in Indonesia are illustrated in Table 4.
21 Yogaprasta A. Nugraha, and Rina Herawati (2015), ‘Menguak Realitas Orang Muda Di Sektor Pertanian Pedesaan [Unmasking 
the Reality of Youth in Agriculture]’, Jurnal Analisis Sosial [Journal of Social Analysis], 19, 27 - 38.
22 According to the World Bank, the urban population in Indonesia was around 120 million or 49.92% of the total population in 
2010. By 2015, this number increased to more than 138 million or 53.74% of the total population. Accessible on http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL?locations=ID & http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.URB.TOTL.IN.ZS?locations=ID 
23 BPS [Statistics Indonesia], ‘Laporan Hasil Sensus Pertanian 2013 (Pencacahan Lengkap) [Agricultural Census Report 2013 
(Complete Calculations)]’, p.18
24 Herman Subagio, and Conny N. Manoppo (2012), ‘Hubungan Karakteristik Petani Dengan Usahatani Cabai Sebagai Dampak Dari 
Pembelajaran FMA (Studi Kasus di Desa Sunju, Kecamatan Marawola, Provinsi Sulawesi Tengah) [Characteristic Relationship between 
Farmers and Chili Farms as the Impact of FMA Study [Case Study in Sunju Village, Marawola Subdistrict, Central Sulawesi Province)] ‘, 
(Ministry of Agriculture - Department of Agricultural Technology Research in Central Sulawesi).
25 Food self-sufficiency refers to a situation in which a state manages to meet all or most of the food needs of its population 
from domestic production (Iqbal Rafani (2014), The Law No. 18/2012 Governing Food Security in Indonesia, Food and Fertilizer 
Technology Center for the Asian and Pacific Region. Accessible on http://ap.fftc.agnet.org/ap_db.php?id=182)
Almost
16 million or more 
than 60% of heads 
of agricultural 
households are aged 
between 45 and above
65 years old.
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Table 4
Overview and Legal Bases of Farm Subsidy Programs in Indonesia
No. Program Commen-cement Current Legal Bases Administered by
2016 
Budget Beneficiaries
Number of Target 
Beneficiaries
1. Subsidies on 
seeds (rice, 
soy beans, 
and corn)*
1986 (rice 
and soy 
beans); 
2004 
(corn)
1. Law 19/2013 on Protection and 
Empowerment of Farmers
2. Regulation of the Minister of 
Agriculture (MOA) 04/2016 with 
Guidelines on Seeds Subsidies 2016
3. Regulation of the Director 
General of Food Crops, Ministry 
of Agriculture 19/KPA/
SK.310/C/2/2016 on Hybrid Corn 
Development Program
Ministry of Agriculture via two 
state-owned enterprises: PT. 
Sang Hyang Seri (SHS) and PT. 
Pertani
IDR 1 
trillion
Any farmers 
who have not 
received any 
other subsidies 
on seeds from 
the government. 
Eligible farmers 
must receive 
formal approval 
from relevant 
officials.
Total volume 
allocation of seeds:
- Rice: 99,750 tons
- Soy beans: 2,500 
tons
- Corn: 18,000 tons
2. Subsidies on 
fertilizers**
1971 1. Law 19/2013 on Protection and 
Empowerment of Farmers
2. MOA 60/2015 on Requirements and 
Highest Retail Prices of Subsidized 
Fertilizers 2016
3. Regulation of the Minister of Trade 
(MOT) 15/2013 on Procurement 
and Distribution of Subsidized 
Fertilizers
Ministry of Agriculture via five 
state-owned enterprises:
- PT Pupuk Sriwijaya, 
- PT Pupuk Kujang
- PT Pupuk Kalimantan Timur, 
Tbk,
- PT Pupuk Iskandar Muda,
- PT Petrokimia Gresik
IDR 30.1 
trillion
- All food crop 
farmers+
- Non-food 
crop 
farmers with 
maximum 
land size of 
2 ha
Total volume 
allocation of 
fertilizers:
- Urea: 4.1 million 
tons
- SP-36: 850,000 tons
- ZA: 1.05 million tons
- NPK: 2.55 million 
tons
- Organic: 1 million 
tons
3. Subsidies on 
Rice (Raskin/
Rastra)***
1998 1. Law 18/2012 on Food
2. Presidential Regulation 68/2002 on 
Food Security
Perum Bulog (National 
Logistics Agency)
IDR 21 
trillion
Registered poor 
households
15.5 million 
households
Notes:
+ : Unlike previous regulations from 2013 to 2015, the current regulation does not limit the food crop farmers entitled to this
     subsidy by their land size. The land size limit of 2 ha still applies to non-food crop farmers.
Sources are collated from:
‘* : Kariyasa (2007);26 Ministry of Agriculture (2016);27 Ministry of Finance (2016)28
** : Piggott et al (1993);29 Zulkifli Mantau and Faisal;30 Ministry of Finance (2016)31
*** : 1. Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture (2017)32
2. Presidential Instruction 05/2015 on Government Policy on Rice Procurement and Distribution
3. Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture (2014)33
4. Ministry of Finance (2016)34
26 Ketut Kariyasa (2007). Usulan Kebijakan Pola Pemberian dan Pendistribusian Benih Bersubsidi [Suggestion on the Distribution 
Patterns of Subsidized Seeds]. Jurnal Analisis Kebijakan Pertanian [Analytical Journal on Agricultural Policy].5 (4). 304 - 319
27 Ministry of Agriculture (2016), ‘Petunjuk Teknis Subsidi Benih Tahun Anggaran 2016 [Technical Guidelines on Subsidized Seeds 
2016]’, p.6
28 Ministry of Finance (2016), ‘Informasi APBN 2016 (Information on 2016 State Budget)’, p.31. 
29 Roley R. Piggott, Kevin A. Parton, Elaine M. Treadgold, and Budiman Hutabarat (1993), Food Price Policy in Indonesia, p.86
30 Zulkifli Mantau, and Faisal, ‘Studi Komprehensif Kebijakan Subsidi Pupuk di Indonesia [Comprehensive Policy Analysis 
Regarding Subsidies on Fertilizer in Indonesia]’, in Seminar Regional Inovasi Teknologi Pertanian, mendukung Program 
Pembangunan Pertanian Propinsi Sulawesi Utara [Regional Conference on Technological Innovation on Farming to Support Agriculture 
Development Program in North Sulawesi Province] (Sulawesi Utara). p. 213
31 See footnote 28
32 Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture (2017), ‘Pedoman Umum Subsidi Rastra [General Guidelines on 
Subsidized Rice]’, p.4
33 Coordinating Ministry for Human Development and Culture (2014), Penerima KKS Masih Berdasarkan Data 2011, Mensos Undang 
Akademisi Cari Solusi [Social Security Recipients Still Based on 2011 Data, Minister of Social Affairs Invites Academics to Find 
Solutions]. Accessible on http://www.kemenkopmk.go.id/artikel/penerima-kks-masih-berdasarkan-data-2011-mensos-undang-
akademisi-cari-solusi. Accessed on 01 December 2016
34 See footnote 28
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Subsidies on seeds
This policy aims to enable farmers to purchase the seeds of rice and soy beans at subsidized 
prices, and the seeds of corn for free. Table 5 provides information on the volume of allocated 
seeds and the size of the target areas of this program. From 2015 to 2016, the allocation of 
subsidized seeds for non-hybrid rice and soybeans was reduced by 1% and 83%, respectively. On 
the other hand, the allocation of hybrid rice and hybrid corn seeds increased sharply by 50% and 
1,100%, respectively. The types of rice seeds include IR-64 (non-hybrid) and SL-8 SHS (hybrid), 
which are the results of cooperation between the Indonesian government and International Rice 
Research Institute (IRRI).35
Table 5
Allocation on Subsidized Seeds, 2015 – 2016
No. Seeds
Allocation for Subsidies
2015 2016
Reference 
Price per 
kg (IDR)
Volume 
(tons)
Target Area 
(ha)
Reference 
Price per kg 
(IDR)
Volume 
(tons)
Target 
Area (ha)
1. Non-hybrid rice 3,050 98,500 3,940,000 2,500 97,500 3,900,000
2. Hybrid rice 5,700 1,500 100,000 4,100 2,250 150,000
3. Soy beans 15,000 300,000 2,500 50,000
- Extension 
seeds (BR)
5,200 3,100
- BR1, BR2, 
BR3, BR4
4,200 2,500
4. Hybrid corn 16,300 1,500 100,000
Free – with 
conditions*
18,000 1,200,000
* Note: Corn seeds are given for free. The quantity depends on the condition in each target area.
Source: Collated from the Ministry of Agriculture36 37 and Kabul Indrawan (2015)38
Subsidies on fertilizer
This policy intends to enable farmers to purchase various fertilizers at subsidized prices, 
including urea, SP-36, ZA, NPK, and organic fertilizers.39 From 2014 to 2015, the government 
increased the allocated volumes of subsidized fertilizers by around 20% for urea, 12% for SP-36, 
31% for ZA, 27% for NPK, and 25% for organic fertilizers, which are shown in Table 6.
35 Satoto and Made J. Mejaya (2014). Hybrid Rice Development in Indonesia, in Hybrid Rice Development in Asia: Assessment 
of Limitations and Potential (Bangkok: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations and The Asia & Pacific Seed 
Association), p. 103 & 107. Accessible on http://www.fao.org/3/a-i4395e.pdf 
36 Elucidation of MOA 04/2016 on 2016 Guidelines on Subsidized Seeds, p.7
37 Ministry of Agriculture (2016), Petunjuk Teknis Gerakan Pengembangan Jagung Hibrida [Technical Guidelines on Hybrid Corn 
Development], p.34, as stated in Regulation of the Director General of Food Crops, MOA 19/KPA/SK.310/C/2/2016 on Hybrid Corn 
Development Program
38 See footnote 16, p.3.
39 Urea (NH2 CONH2) contains high level of nitrogen (46%), which is critical for the healthy growth of leaves and stems. SP-36 
(P
2
O
5
) contains phosphate and is used to accelerate the growth of roots. ZA contains sulphate and ammonium and is used to 
accelerate cell growth and increase the crops’ resilience against drought. NPK contains a mixture between nitrogen (N), rock 
phosphate (P), and chloride (KCl). Organic fertilizers are made of dead plants or animal dungs which contain nutrients needed by 
the crops. Sources: MOA 60/2015 on Requirements and Highest Retail Prices of Subsidized Fertilizers 2016, Sriwidjaja Fertilizer 
(http://www.pusri.co.id/ina/urea-tentang-urea/; http://www.pusri.co.id/ina/produk-npk-fusion/ ; ), Petrokimia Gresik Fertilizer 
(http://www.petrokimia-gresik.com/Pupuk/SP-36.ZK), Faedah Jaya, distributor of fertilizer in Indonesia (https://faedahjaya.com/
distributor-pupuk/tentang-pupuk-za) 
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Table 6
Allocation on Subsidized Fertilizers, 2014 – 2016 
No. Fertilizers
Reference Prices 
(IDR/kg)
Allocation Volume for Subsidies (ton)
2014 2015 2016
1. Urea 1,800 3,418,000 4,100,000 4,100,000
2. SP-36 2,000 760,000 850,000 850,000
3. ZA 1,400 800,000 1,050,000 1,050,000
4. NPK 2,300 2,000,000 2,550,000 2,550,000
5. Organic 500 800,000 1,000,000 1,000,000
Source: Ministry of Agriculture40 41 42
Subsidies on rice (Raskin/Rastra)
While the first two subsidies mentioned above are specific for farmers, subsidies on rice (Raskin/
Rastra)43 is meant for all low-income households (including poor farmers and farm workers) 
registered by the respective local government in their neighborhood.44 Each household is entitled 
to a monthly quota of 15 kg of medium-quality rice for a reference price of IDR 1,600 per kg45 (in 
comparison, the average national market price in May 2017 was IDR 10,850 per kg).46
B. Targeted Social Protection Programs
Indonesia’s current nationwide social protection programs are conditional cash transfer program 
(Program Keluarga Harapan/PKH), as well as financial assistance through health insurance (Jaminan 
Kesehatan Nasional/JKN – Kartu Indonesia Sehat/KIS) and education subsidies (Kartu Indonesia Pintar/
KIP). Unlike the seeds and fertilizer subsidy program discussed in the earlier section, these programs 
are aimed at wider beneficiaries. The target of PKH, JKN-KIS and KIP are poor people who have 
been identified and registered by the Statistics Indonesia’s 2011 Data Collection Program for Social 
Protection (PPLS). Since then, more recipients have been registered by the sub-district and 
villages authorities (for PKH and JKN-KIS) and by school authorities (for KIP) in the targeted 
regions. Table 7 presents an overview of the social protection programs and their legal bases.
In theory, these programs should also cover around 8.6 million households of rice and 
coarse grains (palawija)47 farmers and farm workers. Statistics Indonesia recorded the 
national average income of household planting these crops is IDR 7,573,000 per year or 
around IDR 631,000 per month. According to the World Bank standard, this amount indicates 
these households are in danger of falling into poverty, if they are not poor already.48
40 MOA 122/2013 on Requirements and Highest Retail Prices of Subsidized Fertilizers 2014
41 MOA 130/2014 on Requirements and Highest Retail Prices of Subsidized Fertilizers 2015
42 MOA 60/2015 on Requirements and Highest Retail Prices of Subsidized Fertilizers in the Agricultural Sector 2016
43 “Raskin” stands for “beras untuk orang miskin” (rice for the poor). The term is now replaced by “Rastra” that stands for “beras 
sejahtera” (prosperous rice).
44 While Raskin/Rastra policy is still implemented this year, currently food voucher (voucher pangan) as the new food subsidy system 
is on trial run in 44 municipalities and districts in Indonesia. The government plans to implement the new system nationwide 
in 2018. Source: Executive Office of the President (2016), Voucher Pangan, Terobosan Baru Pengganti Raskin [Food Voucher, New 
Innovation to Replace Subsidized Rice]. Accessible on http://ksp.go.id/voucher-pangan-terobosan-baru-pengganti-raskin/
45 See footnote 32, p.12
46 Indonesian Central Bank (2017), ‘Pusat Informasi Harga Pangan Strategis Nasional – Harga Rata-rata dan Perubahan 23 Mei 2017 [Center 
of National Information on Strategic Food Prices – Average Prices and Changes 23 May 2017]’. Accessible on http://hargapangan.id/ 
47 Among 16.5 million households who rely on agriculture as their main source of income, rice and coarse grains farming 
households have the largest share of percentage (52%). Source: Statistics Indonesia (2013), Agricultural Census 2013.  Accessible 
on https://st2013.bps.go.id/dev2/index.php 
48 See footnote 4
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Table 7
Legal Bases and Overview on Targeted Social Protection Programs in Indonesia
No. Program Commencement Current Legal Bases Administered by 2016 Budget Beneficiaries
Number of Target 
Beneficiaries
1. Hopeful Family 
Program (PKH)*
Conditional Cash 
Transfer
2007 Law 40/2004 on National 
System of Social Security
Ministry of 
Social Affairs 
– supervised 
by the National 
Planning and 
Development 
Agency 
(Bappenas)
IDR 9.98 
trillion
Registered poor 
families (parents 
and children)
6 million families
2. National Health 
Insurance 
(JKN) and Card 
for Healthy 
Indonesians 
(KIS)**
Financial 
Assistance 
through Health 
Insurance
January 2014 
(JKN); November 
2014 (KIS)
1. Law 40/2004 on 
National System of 
Social Security
2. Law 24/2011 on Social 
Protection Coordinating 
Institution
3. Government Regulation 
101/2012 on Financial 
Assistance Recipients 
for Health Insurance 
Program
BPJS Kesehatan 
(state-owned 
enterprise) 
under the 
supervision 
of National 
Council of Social 
Security (DJSN)
IDR 23.38 
trillion 
(JKN); 
IDR 2.12 
trillion 
(KIS)
1. Registered 
poor people 
(JKN & KIS)
2. Newborn 
infants and 
socially 
vulnerable 
persons 
(PMKS)+ 
within poor 
families 
(KIS)
103.5 million people
3. Card for Smart 
Indonesians 
(KIP)***
Financial 
Assistance for 
Education
2015 (continuing 
the ‘Scholarship 
for the Poor’ 
program that ran 
from 2008 to 2014)
Law 17/2007 on the Long-
term National Development 
Plan 2005 – 2025
1. Ministry of 
Education and 
Culture
2. Ministry of 
Religious 
Affairs
IDR 11.56 
trillion
Students from 
registered poor 
families
19.5 million 
students
Notes:
+ : Ministry of Social Affairs states that there are 22 types of ‘socially vulnerable persons’ (PMKS), including neglected 
children, people with disabilities, commercial sex workers, illicit drug users, indigenous communities residing in 
remote areas, and displaced people due to natural disasters. Accessible on http://www.kemsos.go.id/modules.
php?name=Database&opsi=pmks2008-1
Sources are collated from:
‘* : 1. Ministry of Social Affairs (2015)49
2. National Board for Acceleration on Poverty Alleviation (TNP2K) (2016)50
Secretary of the Cabinet (2016)51
** : 1. Government Regulation 101/2012 on Recipients of Financial Assistance for Health Insurance
2. Ministry of Health (2015), Rencana Aksi Kegiatan 2015 sd. 2019 [Action Plan 2015 – 2019], p. 11 & 15
3. National Board for Acceleration on Poverty Alleviation (TNP2K) (2016)52
4. Anastasia Susty Ambarriani (2014)53
5. Office of the President54 
*** : TNP2K (2016)55 56
49 Susi Eko Zuhri Ernada, and Harapan Lumban Gaol (2015), ‘Poverty Alleviation Programmes: Lessons from Indonesia’, in 6th 
Meeting of COMCEC Poverty Alleviation Working Group (Ankara, Turkey: Ministry of Social Affairs). p. 15
50 TNP2K (2016), ‘Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH)’ 2016). Accessible on http://www.tnp2k.go.id/id/tanya-jawab/klaster-i/
program-keluarga-harapan-pkh/. [Accessed 17 November 2016].
51 Secretary of the Cabinet (2016), ‘Presiden Jokowi: Anggaran Program Keluarga Harapan Tahun 2016 Naik Menjadi 9,98 Triliun 
[President Jokowi: Budget for Conditional Cash Transfer Increases to IDR 9.98 Trillion in 2016]. Accessible on http://setkab.go.id/
presiden-jokowi-anggaran-program-keluarga-harapan-tahun-2016-naik-menjadi-998-triliun/. [Accessed 17 November 2016]
52 TNP2K (2016), ‘Kartu Indonesia Sehat [Card for Healthy Indonesians]. Accessible on http://www.tnp2k.go.id/id/program/
program-membangun-keluarga-produktif/kartu-indonesia-sehat. [Accessed 18 November 2016]
53 Anastasia Susty Ambarriani (2014), ‘Hospital Financial Performance in the Indonesian National Health Insurance Era’, Review of 
Integrative Business & Economics, 4(1), 367 – 79, p. 368
54 Office of the President ‘Kemajuan Distribusi KIP dan KIS [The Progress in Distribution of KIP and KIS]’. Accessible on http://
presidenri.go.id/pendidikan/kemajuan-distribusi-kip-dan-kis.html [Accessed 01 December 2016]
55 TNP2K (2016), ‘Kartu Indonesia Pintar (Card for Smart Indonesian)’. Accessible on http://www.tnp2k.go.id/id/program/
program-membangun-keluarga-produktif/kartu-indonesia-pintar/ [Accessed 01 December 2016]
56 TNP2K (2016), ‘Program Bantuan Siswa Miskin (BSM) [Scholarship for the Poor Program]’. Accessible on http://www.tnp2k.go.id/
id/tanya-jawab/klaster-i/program-bantuan-siswa-miskin-bsm/ [Accessed 01 Dec 2016]
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Conditional Cash Transfer - Hopeful Family Programs (PKH)
PKH is a conditional cash transfer program aimed to provide poor households with access to 
healthcare and education.
Table 8
PKH Conditional Cash Transfer Components, 2014 – 2016 
No. Benefits
Annual Amount of Transfer (IDR)
2014 2015 2016
1. Fixed cash transfer 240,000 500,000 500,000
Additional benefits for poor families with:
2. Pregnant/lactating mother or toddlers 1,000,000 1,000,000 1,200,000
3. Elementary school children 500,000 450,000 450,000
4. Junior high school children 1,000,000 750,000 750,000
5. Senior high school children - 1,000,000 1,000,000
6. People with disability - - 3,120,000
Source: Ministry of Social Affairs (2015)57
As shown in Table 8, PKH provides cash transfer to the registered poor families with the 
annual amount paid in quarterly tranches. The total annual amount depends on the condition 
of the members in each recipient family. The recipients must comply with the government’s 
requirements on how they use the cash, such as by taking the pregnant and lactating mothers 
to local healthcare centers and sending their children to school. Each recipient can receive PKH 
only for a maximum of six years to avoid dependency.
Financial Assistance through Health Insurance (JKN and KIS)
The National Health Insurance (JKN) aims to cover basic public healthcare services. All people 
covered by the JKN must pay insurance premiums, which the government fully covers for the poor 
with a monthly rate of IDR 30,000 per person. The poor are entitled to third-class health services 
at designated healthcare centers or hospitals in accordance with their registered domicile in their 
National Identity Card. Meanwhile, the Card for Healthy Indonesians (KIS) is a similar program 
aiming to expand the benefits of JKN for the poor by offering several additional benefits. Firstly, 
it covers not only those who are sick, but also people under the category of ‘socially vulnerable 
persons’58 and newborn infants in poor families.59 Secondly, unlike JKN, KIS is more flexible as it 
allows recipients to use this program in healthcare facilities across Indonesia, including clinics, 
sub-district/village-level public healthcare centers, and hospitals. Thirdly, KIS can also be used 
for preventive treatments such as immunizations.
Financial Assistance for Education (KIP)
This program aims to increase the school enrolment rate of school-aged children (6-18 years 
old) of poor families. KIP provides poor families with financial assistance paid per semester, so 
they can use it to pay school-related fees for their children.
57 See footnote 49
58 See Notes for Table 7 on PMKS 
59 National Board for Acceleration on Poverty Alleviation [TNP2K] (2016), ‘Kartu Indonesia Sehat [Card for Healthy Indonesians]. 
Accessible on http://www.tnp2k.go.id/id/program/program-membangun-keluarga-produktif/kartu-indonesia-sehat [Accessed 
18 November 2016]
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Table 9
Amount of the government’s financial assistance per child under KIP
No. Education Level Financial Assistanceper Semester (IDR)
1. Primary School, including:
•	 Formal school (SD and MI)
•	 Non-formal (Kejar Paket A, Pesantren (Islamic Boarding School) for 
7-12 years old)
225,000
2. Junior high school, including:
•	 Formal school (SMP and MTs)
•	 Non-formal (Kejar Paket B, Pesantren (Islamic Boarding School) for 
13 – 15 years old)
375,000
3. Senior high school, including:
•	 Formal school (SMA and MA)
•	 Non-formal (Kejar Paket C, Pesantren (Islamic Boarding School) for 
16 – 18 years old)
500,000
Source: TNP2K (2016)60
C. Agricultural Insurance Program for Rice Farmers (AUTP)
Table 10
Legal Basis and Overview on Agricultural Insurance for Rice Farmers
Commencement 2012 (prototype projects)
Current legal basis 1. Law 19/2013 on Protection and Empowerment of Farmers
2. MOA 02/2016 on Guidelines on Insurance Premium Assistance for 
Agricultural Insurance for Rice Farmers
Administered by Ministry of Agriculture via PT. Jasindo (state-owned insurance company)
Budget allocation in 2016 IDR 134 billion
Entitled parties Members of farmers’ groups in the villages
Number of targeted area 15 million ha of harvested rice fields
Sources: Collated from Ministry of Finance (2016)61 and Hendrawan (2015)62
Agricultural insurance for rice farmers (Asuransi Usaha Tani Padi/AUTP) is intended to help 
farmers by reducing the risk of income losses due to the impact of climate change.63 The 
insurance protects farmers from harvest failures caused by floods, droughts, pests, as well as 
plant diseases by compensating for their loss up to IDR 6 million per ha per plantation season. The 
compensation will be given only if the damage reaches minimum 75%. Those who can participate 
60 TNP2K (2016), ‘Program Indonesia Pintar Melalui Kartu Indonesia Pintar [Smart Indonesian Program via Card for Smart Indonesian]’. 
Accessible on http://www.tnp2k.go.id/id/tanya-jawab/klaster-i/program-indonesia-pintar-melalui-kartu-indonesia-pintar-kip/ 
[Accessed 01 December 2016]
61 Ministry of Finance (2016), Analisis Strategi Pencapaian Efektivitas Pelaksanaan Anggaran Asuransi Pertanian dalam APBN 
Melalui Analisis SWOT [Analysis on Strategy to Achieve Effective State Budget Disbursement on Rice Farmers Insurance Program 
via SWOT Analysis], Kajian Tematik Direktorat Anggaran Bidang Perekonomian dan Kemaritiman Tahun 2016 [Thematic Analysis of 
the Directorate of Budget on Economics and Maritime Affairs], p. 20 – 21
62 Mulyadi Hendrawan (2015), Rencana Uji Coba Implementasi Asuransi Pertanian 2015 [Testing Plan on the Implementation of 
Agricultural Insurance 2015]. Directorate General of Agricultural Infrastructure, Ministry of Agriculture p.6
63 Ministry of Agriculture (2016), Pedoman Bantuan Premi Asuransi Usahatani Padi [Guidelines on Premium Assistance for 
Agricultural Insurance for Rice Farmers]. Directorate General of Agricultural Infrastructure, as part of the Regulation of the 
Minister of Agriculture 02/2016 on Guidelines on Insurance Premium Assistance for Agricultural Insurance for Rice Farmers, p.1
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in this program are landholding farmers with maximum size of land of 2 ha, and landless farm 
workers who work on land with the same maximum size. The total premium per participant is 
IDR 144,000 per ha per plantation season, in which 80% of it covered by the government. Each 
participant needs to cover the rest or IDR 36,000 per ha per plantation season.64 
Analysis of Policies to Protect and Assist Farmers
Subsidies on seeds
From 2011 to 2015, none of the distribution targets were met for any of the subsidized seeds. The 
Ministry of Agriculture65 and the National Development and Planning Agency (Bappenas)66 stated 
that the main cause was the inability of two government-appointed state-owned enterprises to 
timely produce and distribute the seeds with the quality and variety needed by the farmers. The 
same circumstances also happen to rice seeds subsidy, even though the seeds were created as 
part of the cooperation between the Indonesian government and IRRI.67
Figure 2
Comparison between the targets and the realization of subsidized seeds distribution,
2011 – 2015
Target (Ton) Realization (Ton)
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64 See footnote 63, p. 7
65 Ministry of Agriculture (2015), ‘Laporan Kinerja Direktorat Jenderal Tanaman Pangan 2015 [Performance Report of Directorate 
General of Food Crops 2015]’, ed. by Directorate General of Food Crops, p. 58.
66 National Development and Planning Agency [BAPPENAS] (2011), ‘Laporan Kajian Strategis Kebijakan Subsidi Pertanian Yang 
Efektif, Efisien Dan Berkeadilan [Strategic Review Report on Effective, Efficient, and Fair Agricultural Subsidies Policy]’, p.10.
67 See footnote 35
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Source: Ministry of Agriculture – Performance Report of Directorate General of Food Crops 2011 – 2015
Figure 2 shows that between 2011 and 2015 the realization of subsidized rice, corn 
and soy seeds distribution by the Indonesian government has fallen far below the 
target for each year. In total, from 116,500 tons of allocated seeds, only 5,920 tons 
or 5% was used by the farmers. Considering the risk of receiving poor quality68 
subsidized seeds and the uncertainty of their distribution period,69 some farmers 
prefer to use non-subsidized seeds that provide them with more certainty in terms of 
their expected yields. A farmer in Indramayu recounted his view on subsidized seeds:
68 See footnote 66, p. 74
69 See footnote 16, p. 4
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“To me, subsidized seeds are nothing more than a 
waste of money. There is zero benefit from them” 
~ Abdul, farmer from Karang Layung Village, Indramayu -70
Subsidies on fertilizers
Figure 3
Distribution of Urea Subsidy Spending by Quintiles of Farmers’ Land Size
Q1 (Av. Land size: 0.12 ha)
Q2 (Av. Land size: 0.25 ha)
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Q4 (Av. Land size: 0.73 ha)
Q5 (Av. Land size: 1.97 ha)
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Source: The World Bank (2011)71
A study by the World Bank (Figure 3) showed that only 21% of the recipients of fertilizer 
subsidies fall under the category of small-scale farmers with land up to 0.25 ha. Meanwhile, 
60% of the beneficiaries were farmers who own between three-quarters to nearly 2 ha of land. 
There are several key factors that contribute to this problematic distribution. The first 
factor is the distance between the villages and the government-appointed official sellers 
of these fertilizers. The farther they are from the villages, the more difficult it is for small-
scale farmers to purchase the fertilizers as they face considerable transportation costs.72 
The second factor is the inadequate system of monitoring the distribution process. Due 
to the lack of monitoring, many farmers who control more than 2 ha of land manage to 
circumvent the regulation by splitting their lands into several plots, which are then transferred 
to their family members, who can then receive the subsidy.73 The third factor lies in black-market 
activities. Given the absence of an adequate monitoring system, sharp price disparities between 
subsidized and non-subsidized fertilizer (Table 11) provide a strong incentive for the appointed 
sellers to sell the subsidized fertilizers illegally and outside the targeted regions.74 This leads to 
a scarcity of subsidized fertilizer, which in turn, further diminishes the benefits of this program 
for small-scale farmers, as stated by a farmer from Bojongslawi Village, Indramayu.
70 Interview with a farmer from Karang Layung Village, Indramayu, West Java, 31 March 2017. For privacy reasons, pseudonym is 
used.
71 Camilo Gomez Osorio, Dwi Endah Abriningrum, Enrique Blanco Armas, and Muhammad Firdaus (2011), ‘Who Is Benefiting from 
Fertilizer Subsidies in Indonesia?’, in Policy Research Working Paper (The World Bank), p. 10. Accessible on https://openknowledge.
worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/3519/5758.pdf [Accessed 17 Dec 2016]
72 In Bogor, West Java, there were cases of rich farmers who were the only ones purchasing subsidized fertilizer as only they 
had the means to transport the fertilizer (Tina Rakhmawati (2013), ‘Analisis Efektivitas Subsidi Pupuk dan Faktor-faktor yang 
Mempengaruhi Produksi Padi [Analysis on the Effectiveness of Subsidized Fertilizers and Determinant Factors of Rice Production]’, 
p.44 – 45)
73 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD] (2012), ‘OECD Review of Agricultural Policies: Indonesia 2012’, 
(OECD Publishing), p.156
74 See footnote 71, p.6
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“In my village, subsidized fertilizers are often 
unavailable when we need them. Even when they are 
in stock, their prices are higher than they should be. 
It seems these subsidies only make the distributors 
become richer than ever before.”
~ Sutarman, farmer from Bojongslawi Village, Indramayu –75
Table 11
Price Comparison of Fertilizers
Fertilizer
Prices per kg (IDR)
Subsidized76 Domestic Non-Subsidized77 World Bank Reference* 78
Urea 1,800 3,900 2,831
SP-36 (Phosphate-based) 2,000 3,600 3,622
‘* Notes = Indonesian Central Bank exchange rate per 1 December 2016: USD 1 = IDR 13,417.67
Sources: Ministry of Agriculture; The World Bank; Priceindo.com676777878
The price of subsidized urea is approximately 54% lower than the non-subsidized one in the 
domestic market, and subsidized SP-36 is around 45% cheaper. At the international market, 
subsidized urea is nearly 37% cheaper compared to the World Bank’s reference price, and 
subsidized SP-36 is around 45% cheaper. Subsidized fertilizers are, therefore, sold on black 
markets, both domestically79 and internationally.80 Eventually, the wealthy and well-connected 
farmers are better positioned to reap the program’s benefits.
Subsidized rice for the poor (Raskin/Rastra)
The subsidized rice program has three major problems that reduce its effectiveness. Firstly, 
although it targets poor people only, in practice, the non-poor also enjoy this subsidy.81 The 
targeted poor often find it difficult to receive their quota of 15 kg/month as village officials 
commonly give the rice to other people who claim they are equally eligible. The officials claim 
they do this to maintain a sense of fairness and avoid conflicts among the villagers.82 Secondly, 
75 Interview with Sutarman, a farmer from Bojongslawi Village, Lohbener sub-district, Indramayu, West Java, 31 March 2017. For 
privacy reasons, pseudonym is used.
76 Regulation of the Minister of Agriculture 60/2015 on Requirements and Highest Retail Prices of Subsidized Fertilizers in the 
Agricultural Sector 2016 
77 Harga Pupuk Terbaru Bulan Desember 2016 [Latest Fertilizer Prices December 2016]. Accessible on http://priceindo.com/
harga-pupuk-terbaru/, [Accessed 18 December 2016]
78 The World Bank (2016), ‘World Bank Commodities Price Data (The Pink Sheet) – December 2016’. Accessible on http://pubdocs.
worldbank.org/en/974201480716030226/CMO-Pink-Sheet-December-2016.pdf [Accessed 18 December 2016]
79 Rakhmawati (2013), Analisis Efektivitas Subsidi Pupuk dan Faktor-faktor yang mempengaruhi Produksi Padi (Studi 
Kasus Desa Hambaro, Kecamatan Nanggung, Kabupaten Bogor) [Analysis on Effectiveness of Subsidized Fertilizers 
and Contributong Factors to Rice Paddy Production (Case Study in Hambaro Village, Nanggung Sub-district, Bogor 
District)], p. 2, p. 19 PDF. Accessible on http://repository.ipb.ac.id/bitstream/handle/123456789/66007/H13tra.
pdf;jsessionid=3828D0F12C40B798DC00B2EC5D202855?sequence=1 
80 See footnote 71, p.6
81 Mabel Josune Gabriel Fernandez (2015), ‘Improving Food Access for Poor Households in Indonesia: Cash Transfers and the Raskin 
Program Reform’ (Harvard University). Accessible on http://ash.harvard.edu/files/ash/files/mabel_gabriel_sypa_mar_15_2015_
final.pdf, p.17
82 Muliadi Widjaja, ‘Indonesia: In Search of a Placement-Support Social Protection’, ASEAN Economic Bulletin, 29 (2012), 184 – 96, 
p. 193.
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the poor are made to pay more than the fixed price and are charged with additional 
transport and packaging costs.83 In some cases, the weak monitoring system also 
leads to fraud and manipulation.84 Thirdly, the rice sold at subsidized prices is 
often not the intended medium-quality rice but rather poor in quality.85 86 At least 
one of these main problems occurs in various provinces in Indonesia, including 
North Sumatera,87 East Java,88 and DKI Jakarta.89
These circumstances contribute to the discrepancies between the total subsidized 
rice procured by Bulog and those purchased by the targeted households (Figure 4). 
From 2006 to 2009, the annual average of purchase only accounted for 44.6% from 
Bulog’s total procurement for the same period.
Figure 4
Comparison Between Government Procurement and Household Purchases of
Subsidized Rice (million Kg), 2006 - 2009
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Source: The World Bank (2012)90
83 The World Bank (2012), ‘Raskin Subsidized Rice Delivery: Social Assistance Program and Public Expenditure Review 3’, p.21
84 Ari A. Perdana (2014), ‘The Future of Social Welfare Programs in Indonesia: From Fossil-Fuel Subsidies to Better Social Protection’, 
(Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) & International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), p.9
85 DKI Jakarta (Mabel Josune Gabriel Fernandez (2015), ‘Improving Food Access for Poor Households in Indonesia: Cash Transfers 
and the Raskin Program Reform’ (Harvard University), p.17. Accessible on http://ash.harvard.edu/files/ash/files/mabel_gabriel_
sypa_mar_15_2015_final.pdf
86 Amelia Fitrotun Nisak (2014), ‘Implementasi Kebijakan Beras Miskin (Raskin) di Kecamatan Kenjeran Kota Surabaya: Studi 
Deskriptif Pada Kelurahan Tanah Kalikedinding [Implementation of Subsidized Rice Policy in Kenjeran Subdistrict, Surabaya, East Java 
(Descriptive Study on Tanah Kalikedinding Village)]’, Jurnal Politik Muda, 3(2), 17 – 25, p.23
87 Juniati Bakkara, Rahmanta Ginting, Emalisa, ‘Analisis Efektifitas Distribusi Beras Miskin (Raskin)  Studi Kasus: Desa Sitalasari 
Kecamatan Siantar Kabupaten Simalungun [Analysis on the Effectiveness of Subsidized Rice Distribution: Case Study in Siantar Sub-
district, Simalungun, North Sumatera]. Accessible on http://jurnal.usu.ac.id/index.php/ceress/article/viewFile/8094/3483 
88 Andri Winandra (2012), ‘Evaluasi Distribusi Program Beras Miskin (Raskin): Studi di Desa Sidoharjo, Kecamatan Gedeg, Kabupaten 
Mojokerto [Evaluation on Subsidized Rice (Raskin) Distribution: Case Study in Sidoharjo, Mojokerto, East Java. Accessible on https://
core.ac.uk/download/pdf/12218532.pdf
89 See footnote 81
90 See footnote 83, p.20
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Conditional Cash Transfer - Hopeful Family Program (PKH)
While PKH’s immediate impact may not be necessarily significant at the moment, this instrument 
could stimulate significant development in the future.91 Several studies show the positive impact 
of this program on poor households, especially in the areas of health and education.92 93 
Table 12
Impact of PKH on Health and Education Indicators
No.
Health Education
Indicators
Estimated 
impact (%)
Indicators
Estimated 
impact (%)
1. Pre-natal visits to 
healthcare facilities
7.1 Primary school (7 – 12 y.o.) – Gross 
enrolment
1.8
2. Assisted delivery 6.8 Primary school – Attendance > 85% 1.3
3. Delivery at health 
facility
3.9 Primary school – Drop-out rate -0.9
4. Completed 
immunization (by 
schedule and age)
7.7 Secondary school (13 – 15 y.o.) – 
Gross enrolment
9.5
5. Severe stunting 
occurrences
2.7 Secondary school – Attendance >85% 0.8
6. Secondary school – Drop-out rate -0.7
7. Transition rates (13 – 15 y.o.) 17.8
8. Transition rates all (7 – 15 y.o.) 8.8
Source: TNP2K (2016)94
PKH’s positive impact lies in the increasing number of visits by 
pregnant mothers to sub-district/village-level healthcare facilities, 
completed immunization activities, as well as school enrolment and 
transition rates (Table 12). The increased number of assisted births 
and completed immunizations reduces the mortality rate of mothers, 
infants, and toddlers.95 Meanwhile, PKH’s impact on transition rates of 
students indicates their increased chances to continue their studies 
and progress from one level to the next, especially from primary to 
secondary schools.
91 Huck-ju Kwon, and Woo-rim Kim, ‘The Evolution of Cash Transfers in Indonesia: Policy Transfer and National Adaptation’, Asia & the 
Pacific Policy Studies, 2 (2015), 425 - 40.
92 Togiaratua Nainggolan (2012), ‘Program Keluarga Harapan di Indonesia: Dampak Pada Rumah Tangga Sangat Miskin di Tujuh 
Provinsi [PKH in Indonesia: Impacts on the Poor Households in Seven Provinces’, ed. by Juneman, p.127
93 M. Ramesh, ‘Social Protection in Indonesia and the Philippines: Work in Progress’, Journal of Southeast Asian Economies, 31 
(2014), 40-56, p.45
94 Elan Satriawan (2016), ‘Evaluating Longer-Term Impact of Indonesia’s CCT Program: Evidence from a Randomised Control Trial’, in 
JPAL SEA Conference on Social Protection (Jakarta: National Board for Acceleration on Poverty Alleviation [TNP2K], 2016), p. 23, 25
95 Maternal mortality went down from 359 (2012) to 305 (2015). Meanwhile, in every 1,000 live births, infant mortality reduced 
from 32 (2012) to 22.23 (2015), and toddler mortality reduced from 40 (2012) to 26.29 (2015). 
Ministry of Health (2015), Profil Kesehatan Indonesia Tahun 2015 [Health Profile in Indonesia 2015], p. 104 & 125 
PKH’s positive impact lies 
in the increasing number of 
visits by pregnant mothers 
to subdistrict/village-
level healthcare facilities, 
completed immunization 
activities, as well as school 
enrolment and transition rates
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Table 13
Proportion of PKH Budget Allocation and Targeted Recipients, 2007 – 2016
Year
PKH Budget 
Allocation (IDR 
billion)*
Total State 
Budget (IDR 
billion)**
%
Targeted 
Recipients*
Poverty 
headcount 
(million)***
%
2007 605 763,570 0.08 387,887 37.17 1.04
2008 946 752,373 0.13 405,955 34.96 1.16
2009 1,068 1,037,100 0.10 675,636 32.53 2.08
2010 1,123 1,047,700 0.11 778,000 31.02 2.51
2011 1,610 1,229,600 0.13 1,116,000 30,02 3.72
2012 2,217 1,435,400 0.15 1,516,000 29.13 5.20
2013 2,093 1,726,190 0.12 1,404,000 28.55 4.92
2014 1,765 1,842,500 0.10 1,170,000 27.73 4.22
2015 6,457 2,039,500 0.32 3,500,000 28.51 12.28
2016 9,980 2,095,700 0.48 6,000,000 27.76 21.61
Sources:
‘* = Collated from The World Bank (2012);96 Ministry of Finance;97 Indonesian President press statement98 
** = Indonesian Government State Budget 2007 – 2016
*** = Statistics Indonesia99 100
Despite nearly one decade of implementation, PKH’s coverage developed significantly only in the 
recent years. In terms of budget allocation, after a period of stagnation from 2007 to 2012, followed 
by a declining trend from 2012 to 2014, there is a positive sign in 2015 and 2016 that the government 
have started to put more resources into this program (Table 13). Nevertheless, its 2016 budget is 
still limited and lacks meaningful impacts as it only targets less than a quarter of the total number 
of poor people in the country. There are also reports from farmers in Indramayu, West Java where 
some families with decent income also received PKH while some poor households did not.101
“The quota of PKH is not in line with the number of 
people who need it. Its statistics are messy, and its 
targeting is even worse, as I often see those who receive 
them have decent income already. Those who are poor, 
on the other hand, don’t get PKH at all. Why does nobody 
cross-check this thing?”
~ Nurjaman, a farmer from Ranca Mulya 102
96 The World Bank (2012), ‘PKH Conditional Cash Transfer: Social Assistance Program and Public Expenditure Review 6’, (Jakarta: The 
World Bank), p. 14, 24, 29 – 30
97 Ministry of Finance (2015), ‘Kajian Program Keluarga Harapan [Review on Hopeful Family Program], p. 2
98 Indonesian President (2016), ‘Merajut Masa Depan Lewat Program Keluarga Harapan [Build a Better Future with Hopeful Family Program]. 
Accessible on http://presidenri.go.id/pengentasan-kemiskinan/merajut-masa-depan-lewat-program-keluarga-harapan.html 
99 Statistics Indonesia (2013), ‘Jumlah dan Persentase Penduduk Miskin 2007 – 2012 [Poverty Statistics 2007 – 2012]’. Accessible on 
https://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1489 
100 Statistics Indonesia (2016), ‘Jumlah Penduduk Miskin Menurut Provinsi, 2013 – 2016 [Poverty Statistics by province 2013 – 2016]’. 
Accessible on https://www.bps.go.id/linkTableDinamis/view/id/1119   
101 Interview with farmers from the villages of Gabus Kulon, Gabus Wetan, and Ranca Mulya, Indramayu, West Java
102 Interview with Nurjaman, a farmer from Ranca Mulya Village, Gabuswetan Sub-district, Indramayu, West Java. For privacy 
reasons, fictitious name is used.
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This limitation is attributed to the condition of PKH’s infrastructure. The program suffers from 
the lack of a properly functioning management information system that supports its payments 
via various pay-points. This issue causes significant delays and errors in the disbursement of 
payments to the recipients’ bank account, and limits the program’s capacity to exercise oversight 
and monitoring on fund disbursement.103
Financial Assistance through Health Insurance (JKN and KIS)
The additional benefits of KIS in terms of inclusivity, flexibility in choosing health 
care facilities, and covering preventive treatments make this program more relevant 
for the poor compared to JKN. Therefore, the development of government’s financial 
assistance on health services for the poor must continue this path while taking 
lessons from JKN’s nearly three years of implementation since January 2014.
There are two key issues to address in regards to JKN. Firstly, its health service 
quality across the country is unequal and considered poor in many areas,104 including 
in rice-producing regions where most farmers reside. In West Java, community 
health centers (Puskesmas) only meet around 70% of basic amenities requirements 
such as electricity, toilets, as well as water and sanitation.105 In Central Java, less 
than 40% community health centers have computer and internet required to process 
JKN expeditiously. These circumstances occur due to the absence of an independent 
monitoring system for the quality of medical services at the district level, and the 
lack of auditing regulations for the managing state-owned enterprises that manage 
these services.106 
Secondly, a joint study by GIZ and the National Council of Social Security107 revealed 
that, despite explicit rules prohibiting hospitals from charging JKN patients, around 
18% of the study respondents paid out-of-pocket (OOP) expenses at health care 
facilities, especially on medicines. The inadequate and untimely supply of the 
required medicines to the healthcare facilities leads to the unavailability of those 
medicines when they are needed.  
103 National Board for Acceleration on Poverty Alleviation [TNP2K] and National Development and Planning Agency (Bappenas) 
(2012), ‘Disbursement of Social Assistance Cash Transfers through Bank Accounts: A Study of PKH Payment Mechanisms and Options 
for Social Assistance Cash Transfers’, p. iii.
104 Elizabeth Pisani, Maarten Olivier Kok, and Kharisma Nugroho, ‘Indonesia’s Road to Universal Health Coverage: A Political 
Journey’, Health Policy and Planning, 00 (2016), 1 – 10, p.8
105 World Bank and Ministry of Health (2014), Supply-side Readiness for Universal Health Coverage: Assessing the Depth of Coverage 
for Non-Communicable Diseases in Indonesia, p. 27
106 Laksono Trisnantoro, Julita Hendrartini, Tana Susilowati, Putu Astri Dewi Miranti, and Vini Aristianti (2016), ‘Chapter 3: A 
Critical Analysis of Selected Healthcare Purchasing Mechanisms in Indonesia’, in Strategic purchasing in China, Indonesia and the 
Philippines, ed. by Ayako Honda, Di McIntyre, Kara Hanson and Viroj Tangcharoensathien (World Health Organization), p.113 & 121
107 Budi Hidayat, Mundiharno, Jiří Němec, Viktoria Rabovskaja, Cut Sri Rozanna, and Julius Spatz (2015), ‘Out-of-Pocket Payments 
in the National Health Insurance of Indonesia: A First Year Review’, (National Council of Social Security (DJSN) and German 
Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ), p.4 & 7.
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Figure 5
Incidence of OOP Payments by Income Quartiles
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Figure 6
Average OOP Payments by Income Quartiles
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Source for Figure 5 and 6: DJSN and GIZ (2015)108
Figure 5 shows that at least 1 out of 4 poor inpatients and 1 out of 10 poor outpatients are 
charged out-of-pocket payments by the healthcare facilities. Figure 6 shows that on average, the 
poor outpatients are charged more than IDR 200,000 while inpatients paid above IDR 1,000,000. 
The DJSN/GIZ study further explains that poor outpatients’ OOP equals to 21% of their monthly 
household income, while the poor inpatients’ OOP cost them nearly twice (180%) of their 
household income per month.
Financial Assistance for Education (KIP)
As recorded by the National Board for Acceleration on Poverty Alleviation (TNP2K),109 the “Financial 
Assistance for Education” program suffered a budget reduction. Its budget allocation in 2016 (IDR 
11.6 trillion) was 9% less than in 2015 (IDR 12.8 trillion). In response, the number of targeted 
recipients decreased slightly by 4%, from 20.3 million in 2015 to 19.5 million children in 2016. 
108 Budi Hidayat, Mundiharno, Jiří Němec, Viktoria Rabovskaja, Cut Sri Rozanna, and Julius Spatz (2015), ‘Out-of-Pocket Payments 
in the National Health Insurance of Indonesia: A First Year Review’, (National Council of Social Security (DJSN) and German 
Corporation for International Cooperation (GIZ), p.5.
109 National Board for Acceleration on Poverty Alleviation [TNP2K] (2016), ‘Kartu Indonesia Pintar (Card for Smart Indonesian)’. 
Accessible on http://www.tnp2k.go.id/id/program/program-membangun-keluarga-produktif/kartu-indonesia-pintar/ [Accessed 
01 December 2016]
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Figure 7
Comparison between the Cost of Primary School Education and Benefits of BSM/KIP, 2009 – 2015
Primary School Education Cost (per year) BSM/KIP’s Real Value (per year)
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Source:  Collated from The World Bank (2012) and TNP2K (2016)110
Notes: 
1. The World Bank111 stated that BSM/KIP benefits’ real value from 2008 to 2010 (two-year period) has declined by 13 to 14% 
due to inflation (adjusted by using poverty basket price index). Meanwhile, cost of education in real terms has increased by 
20 to 50% between 2006 and 2009 (three-year period). 
2. Based on the World Bank statement mentioned above, in this figure we calculate that BSM/KIP real value declines by 6.5% 
per year, while the cost of education increases by 6.5% annually.
Between 2009 and 2015, the value of the “Scholarship for the Poor” and “Financial 
Assistance for Education” programs (BSM/KIP) went down from 49% to 22% of the 
primary school education costs (Figure 7). A similar development happened to the 
cost of junior and senior high school education.112 Since the amount of benefits per 
KIP recipient has remained unchanged since 2008, its impact on allowing the poor 
access to education has consistently decreased and, especially in case of further 
budget cuts, this trend will most likely continue in the future.
These circumstances contribute to the average school participation rate of 
students aged 16 – 18 years old (senior high school age) in Indonesia that only 
reached at 70.8% in 2016.113 In fact, the school participation rates in several food-
crop-producing regions are even lower than the national average. The participation 
rates in three main food baskets in Indonesia, West Java, Central Java, and East 
Java114 are only 65.8 (second-lowest in the country), 67.9, and 70.5%, respectively. 
This situation indicates that farmers in these regions are struggling to send their 
children to attend higher education level.
110 National Board for Acceleration on Poverty Alleviation (TNP2K) (2016), ‘Program Bantuan Siswa Miskin [Scholarship for the Poor 
Program]. Accessible on http://www.tnp2k.go.id/id/tanya-jawab/klaster-i/program-bantuan-siswa-miskin-bsm/ [Accessed 17 
November 2016]
111 The World Bank (2012), ‘Bantuan Siswa Miskin (Cash Transfers for Poor Students): Social Assistance Program and Public 
Expenditure Review 5’, (Jakarta: The World Bank), p.14
112 See footnote 111, p.14
113 Statistics Indonesia (2017), Angka Partisipasi Sekolah (APS) menurut Provinsi, 2011-2016 [School Participation Rate by Provinces, 
2011 – 2016. Accessible on https://www.bps.go.id/linkTableDinamis/view/id/1054 
114 These three provinces are the top producers of rice and soy in Indonesia. Along with Lampung and South Sulawesi, they 
are also part of the main corn producers in the country. Source: Statistics Indonesia (2016), Statistik Indonesia 2016 [Statistics 
Indonesia 2016], p. 205, 208, and 211.
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Agricultural Insurance for Rice Farmers (AUTP)
Despite its potential, this program does not attract many farmers in the main rice-producing 
regions due to the lack of information about the benefits of the program. 115 116 While the 
government claimed that AUTP has covered 3 million ha of harvested area in 2016, this figure 
only constitutes 19.9% of the program’s target,117 or just around 37% of the total size of rice fields 
in Indonesia.118 A recent study in Malang, East Java even showed a 60% decline on the size of land 
insured by AUTP, from 4,000 ha in 2015 to 1,600 ha in 2016.119
Rice farmers in Indramayu reported that this low interest is attributed to the minimum 
understanding of the farmers to the terms and conditions of the insurance.120 The infrequent 
dissemination efforts and unconvincing deliveries of information from both the local government 
and PT. Jasindo agents contribute to these circumstances. The farmers also revealed that the 
lack of preparedness of the sub-district officers in handling the insurance-related documents 
hinders the compensation process of AUTP. This situation contributes to the poor service delivery 
of this program, which then adds to the difficulty in promoting it to the farmers. 
115 Victorianus Sat Pranyoto (2016), ‘Program Asuransi Pertanian Masih Minim Peminat [Agricultural Insurance Attracts Few Farmers 
Only] ‘, Antara News. Accessible on http://www.antaranews.com/berita/596629/program-asuransi-pertanian-masih-minim-
peminat  [Accessed 01 December 2016]
116 Destyan H. Sujarwoko, ‘Asuransi Pertanian Kurang Diminati Petani Tulungagung [Agricultural Insurance Fails to Attract Farmers 
in Tulungagung]’ (2016). Accessible on http://www.antarajatim.com/berita/180802/asuransi-pertanian-kurang-diminati-petani-
tulungagung [Accessed 01 December 2016]
117 See footnote 61, p.20
118 Statistics Indonesia (2016), ‘Statistik Indonesia – Statistical Yearbook of Indonesia 2016’, p. 202
119 Bambang Siswadi, and Farida Syakir (2016), ‘Respon Petani Terhadap Program Pemerintah Mengenai Asuransi Usaha Tani 
Padi (AUTP) [Farmers’ Responses to Government’s Rice Farmers Insurance Program (AUTP)]’, in Seminar Nasional Pembangunan 
Pertanian [National Seminar on Agricultural Development].
120 Interview with the farmers from the villages of Bojongslawi and Leuwigede, Indramayu, West Java, 31 March 2017
The low interest on AUTP is attributed 
to the minimum understanding of the 
farmers to the terms and conditions of the 
insurance…and the lack of preparedness 
of the sub-district officers in handling the 
insurance-related documents
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Summary of Assessment and Recommendations
We summarize our assessment on the existing programs as described in the table 14 below.
Table 14
Assessment Summary on the Existing Programs to Protect and Assist the Farmers
No. Program Description Assessment
1. Subsidies on Seeds Enabling farmers to purchase 
the seeds of rice and soy 
beans at subsidized prices, 
and the seeds of corn for 
free.
Less effective
The subsidized seeds carry the risk of poor 
quality and uncertainty of their distribution 
period. As the result, farmers prefer to 
use non-subsidized seeds, as indicated by 
subsidized seeds low-level of realization at 
just 5.08% from their target.
2. Subsidies on 
Fertilizers
Enabling farmers to purchase 
various fertilizers at 
subsidized prices, including 
urea, SP-36, ZA, NPK, and 
organic fertilizers.
Less effective
This policy benefits the rich more than it 
does poor farmers, as 60% of its recipients 
each owns between three-quarters to 
nearly 2 ha of land. Problematic distribution 
process, lack of monitoring system, and 
black market activities contribute to this 
situation.
3. Subsidies on Rice 
(Raskin/Rastra)
Providing low-income 
households (including poor 
farmers and farm workers) 
with a monthly quota of 15 kg 
of medium-quality rice for a 
reference price of IDR 1,600 
per kg.
Less effective
The poor must pay more than the reference 
price as they must deal with various extra 
costs, fraud, and manipulations. In addition, 
the rice quality is poor. These circumstances 
contribute to the low annual average of 
purchase by the targeted households that 
only accounted for 44.6% from Bulog’s total 
procurement.
4. Conditional Cash 
Transfer (PKH)
Providing poor households 
with cash transfers to open 
their access to healthcare 
and education services.
More effective (improvement required)
This program has increased the number 
of visits by pregnant mothers to local 
healthcare facilities and completed 
immunization activities. This development 
has reduced the maternal mortality rate 
by 15%, and toddler mortality by 34% from 
2012 to 2015.  This program also increases 
secondary school gross enrolment by 
9.5%, and enhances the transition rates 
of students by 17.8%. Nevertheless, 
this program could be improved even 
further by enhancing the capacity of its 
management information system, so it 
could support more pay points and exercise 
better oversight and monitoring on its 
disbursement.
29
No. Program Description Assessment
5. Financial 
Assistance for 
Health Services 
(JKN and KIS)
Providing poor households, 
including their newborn 
infants, with basic health 
insurance via clinics, public 
healthcare centers, and 
hospitals.
More effective (improvement required)
While this program could potentially 
help the poor farmers in obtaining 
healthcare services, lack of basic amenities 
requirements in the local clinics and 
healthcare facilities hinders the delivery 
of this program. There are 11 in every 
100 cases where the poorest patients 
need to pay out-of-pocket expenses due 
to inadequate and untimely supply of the 
medicines.
6. Financial 
Assistance for 
Education (KIP)
Providing poor families with 
financial assistance paid per 
semester, so they can use it 
to pay school-related fees for 
their children
More effective (improvement required)
This program could have helped much more 
poor farmers in sending their children to 
school if only it did not suffer from budget 
reduction. As the 2016 budget is 9% less 
than in 2015, the number of targeted 
recipients decreased by 4%. Furthermore, 
since the amount of benefits per KIP 
recipient has remained unchanged since 
2008 despite of the inflation rate, its impact 
has consistently decreased.
7. Agricultural 
Insurance for Rice 
Farmers (AUTP)
Compensating farmers’ 
income losses due to harvest 
failures caused by floods, 
droughts, pests, as well as 
plant diseases.
More effective (improvement required)
The lack of information about the program’s 
potential benefits makes the farmers 
unaware of its importance. Only 36.97% of 
the total size of rice fields covered by this 
program. Infrequent dissemination efforts, 
unconvincing deliveries of information, and 
lack of preparedness of the relevant officers 
in handling the documents makes it difficult 
to promote this program.
The social protection system must be made more inclusive to cover all the poor people regardless 
of whether they live in rural or urban areas. Its programs must have wider coverage and better 
monitoring scheme. We propose three suggestions to improve the situation:
Re-allocate the budget for subsidized seeds, fertilizer, and rice to 
PKH, KIS, KIP, and AUTP
The total combination of 2016 state budget for subsidized seeds, fertilizers, and rice amounts 
to IDR 52 trillion. This figure is twice as much as the budget on PKH, KIS, KIP, and AUTP which 
amounts to only IDR 23.7 trillion. Moreover, the subsidy programs are struggling with a bad track 
record of budget misappropriation. A World Bank study121 shows that social assistance programs 
such as PKH, KIS, and KIP have a greater impact on the poor’s welfare as they directly address 
the issue of low income, health, and education. Meanwhile, AUTP has the potential to become an 
essential protection tool for the farmers to reduce the risk of harvest failures. Allocating more 
budget for these programs will enable the government to expand their coverage and improve the 
service quality as well the accuracy of the database. 
121 The World Bank (2015), ‘Indonesia’s Rising Divide’, p.32.
30
An example is provided by the conditional cash transfer program ‘Bolsa Familia’ in 
Brazil. The Brazilian government uses a Single Registry system to create a database 
of targeted poor households. Different government sectors use the same system for 
various complementary programs, thus minimizing the possibility of data duplication 
and discrepancies.122 As a result, this system improves targeting techniques and 
provides more efficiency to the programme.123 In 2012, using a budget of USD 10.7 
billion124 or 1.2% of the total federal budget,125 this program covered 41.2 million 
recipients, or 22.2% of the entire Brazilian population.126 It reduced the poverty gap 
by 18%, the severity of poverty by 22%, and inequality by between 16 and 21%.127
Paradigm shift and focus on improving the programs’ impact
Re-allocating budget for subsidies requires a paradigm shift in the country that must 
be clearly communicated to the public. While farmers and farm workers will lose 
their access to subsidized prices of farm inputs and rice, in practice these subsidies 
only benefit the rich farmers and the distributing agents. Low level of purchase by 
the targeted households indicates these subsidies could only draw small interest 
from their intended recipients.
On the other hand, as the budget allocation for PKH, KIS, and KIP increases, the next 
steps need to improve the impact of each program. PKH should improve its targeting 
system so it could reach all poor families in urban and rural areas, including the poor 
farmers and farm workers. It also should have a better technological infrastructure 
– to accelerate the disbursement of payments – and a greater variety of pay points 
to reach more poor people, especially those who reside in remote areas. Meanwhile, JKN-KIS 
needs to concentrate on improving the quality of healthcare services and facilities as well as 
addressing the challenges in medicine procurement and distribution to all regions. As for KIP, the 
government should use their budget to progressively increase the amount of benefits by taking 
the inflation rate into account.
122 Sergei Soares (2012), ‘Bolsa Familia, Its Design, Its Impacts and Possibilities for the Future’, (International Policy Centre for 
Inclusive Growth), p.4 & 5.
123 Luis Marcelo Videro Vieira Santos (2010), ‘Bolsa Familia Programme: Economic and Social Impacts under the Perspective of the 
Capabilities Approach’, in BIEN 2010 Brasil (University of London), p.22 & 23.
124 United Nations Development Programme [UNDP] (2013), ‘Bolsa Familia Budget Expected to Increase by $2.1 Billion USD in 2013’. 
Accessible on http://pressroom.ipc-undp.org/federal-government-announced-an-additional-2-1-billion-usd-for-bolsa-familia-
in-2013/ [Accessed 01 December 2016].
125 The World Bank (2016), ‘Government Budget’. Accessible on http://obtables.worldbank.org/boost_brazil2/  [Accessed 01 
December 2016].
126 See footnote 121, p.6
127 Sergei Soares (2012), ‘Bolsa Família: A Summary of Its Impacts’, (International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth).
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Improve the service quality of agricultural insurance system and 
extend its coverage beyond rice farmers
The government needs to intensify the dissemination of information to inform the farmers about 
the benefits of AUTP as an integral part of their protection program. Conducting further studies 
and comprehensive reviews of the current insurance mechanism are necessary to determine 
the best practices that suit the farmers’ needs. The registration and claim processes must 
be streamlined and simplified to ensure that farmers can execute these processes without 
difficulties. Capacity-building programs must be conducted for the relevant government 
officers who directly handle these processes to improve the speed and quality of AUTP service 
to the farmers. 
Expanding the insurance coverage means not only covering rice farmers but also of other food 
crops. To do this, the government should form additional partnership with private insurance 
firms. With a wider network of branches and agents, these private firms will complement PT. 
Jasindo’s capability of reaching the farmers in remote regions across the country. Furthermore, it 
is worth considering using agricultural insurance as an investment opportunity for these private 
firms. By doing this, the government should be able to gradually reduce the burden of subsidizing 
the insurance premium and instead shift it to improve the service quality of the program as 
mentioned before. 
The government should form additional 
partnership with private insurance firms, 
so they could reach the farmers in remote 
regions across the country.
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